

# Public Value Dimensions

Identifying patterns in what public leaders see as desirable

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In recent years, public administration research has paid greater attention to the study of public values (e.g., Beck Jørgensen & Andersen, 2010; Bozeman, 2007; Charles, de Jong & Ryan, 2011; De Bruijn & Dicke, 2006; Davis & West, 2009; de Graaf & Van der Wal, 2010; Martinsen & Beck Jørgensen, 2010; Meynhardt, 2009; Plant, Stalebrink, & Vasavada, 2010; Steenhuisen, 2009; Vrangbæk, 2009). After a rather one-sided focus on efficiency, a key aspect of this new interest is the acknowledgement of the multidimensionality of the value universe. Even the OECD – with its traditional emphasis on efficiency – has devoted increased attention to the variety of public values (OECD, 1996, 2000, 2008). The point of departure of this paper is that a multiple values approach renders value classification and the analysis of value conflicts important.

The purpose of a classification is initially the creation of order, given that “order is a prerequisite for explanation or interpretation, as well as prescription” (Rutgers, 2008: 94). Different types of classifications already exist in the value literature (e.g., frequency of use, chronology, hard versus soft values, families of values concerning economy versus fairness versus security; Rutgers, 2008: 95ff), but the establishment of the different classes of values is rarely based on theory and tested empirically. This makes it difficult to attribute specific values to the classes and to see whether the classes are *exclusive* and *comprehensive*. If we want to reduce complexity, we also need *consistent* value dimensions, meaning that individuals (and organizations) attaching great importance to one value within the dimension also tend to see the other values within the dimension as important.

Second, multiple values imply value conflicts, which inevitably lead to organizational design conflicts. To understand the nature and possibilities of value and design conflicts, we require classifications linking values and organizational design.

Finally, most existing classifications are either of values as such (e.g. Hodgkinson, 1996) or organizational values (e.g. Quinn & Rohrbaug, 1983). We want to integrate the public value literature further with other strands of literature within Public Administration. We therefore require a more specific classification of *public* values. We will seek inspiration from previous attempts at developing typologies for public values but will argue that a typology is most useful for empirical public administration studies if it explicitly links to organizational dimensions.

This paper contributes to the development of a systematic ordering of public values. We know that public values are ultimately context-dependent and that all classifications can only

be exclusive and comprehensive in a given context, as “there are no inherently prime values, nor indisputable self-evident truths” (Beck Jørgensen & Bozeman, 2007: 373). Still, public values must be sorted out to allow stringent analysis, and this paper aims to provide a classification based on an existing typology of governance forms and an empirical study of the values of public managers. Such a classification can hopefully enable more precise analyses of value conflicts and improve the integration between the public value literature and other parts of the Public Administration discipline.

The paper proceeds as follows: We first define values and *public* values; we then present a number of typologies and explain why we choose a classification of four forms of governance and how a potential classification of values can be connected to these principles. After an overview of the data and methods, we present our empirical results outlining the patterns in what Danish public managers see as public values. The paper concludes with a discussion of the limitations and potential of the presented classification.

### **What are (public) values?**

Kluckhohn defines a value as “a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action” (1962: 395). The core in Kluckhohn’s definition is the word ‘desirable’. A value is not merely something that an individual can ‘desire’, but rather something found personally or socially acceptable to wish for. Or, according to Nalbandian (1998: 622), values are “deep seated beliefs about what is right and wrong.” In other words, a value is more than a longing for a cold beer on a hot summer day, and values are also far less fleeting than such desires. Bozeman thus emphasizes how “(v)alues are difficult to change and a change can be brought about only after careful deliberation” (2007: 117). In sum, values are assumed to have considerable significance for individual and collective actors alike.

Bozeman (2007: 13) defines *public* values as specifying:

- “the rights, benefits, and prerogatives to which citizens should (and should not) be entitled;
- the obligations of citizens to society, the state and one another; and

- the principles on which governments and policies should be based.”

Public values are linked to government by specifying the desirable in terms of (1) citizen rights, benefits, and prerogatives, (2) citizen obligations, and (3) principles for government and policies. In the following, we focus on the systemic element in the definition, that is, the principles upon which governments and policies should be based, as we want to focus on the link between values and organizational design.

### **Value typologies and organizational principles for the public sector**

A number of value classifications have been developed over time. The first value classification in Public Administration is probably that of Christopher Hood (1991). In his classic article on NPM, Hood uses Greek symbols to denote three categories of public values: *sigma* (efficiency and output orientation), *theta* (honesty, fairness, mutuality), and *lambda* (robustness, adaptability, reliability). Hood argues that the emerging meta trend, New Public Management, was most closely related to the first type of public values and that a public sector designed to promote such values might be less well suited to safeguard the two other types of basic value principles (cf. also De Bruijn & Dicke, 2006).

Swedish Professor Lennart Lundquist distinguishes between market principles, negotiation principles, and citizen principles as basic organizing principles for the public sector. He argues that the extensive use of market principles may undermine fundamental public values such as openness, mutual responsiveness, dialogue, and responsibility. His basic concern is the imbalance between economic values and democratic values (Lundquist, 2001). Both authors thus relate their discussion of public values to a concern for organizational design within the public sector, emphasizing how different designs may promote some basic values at the expense of others.

Other authors have taken a perspective that is more detached from organizational issues. Christopher Pollitt (2003: 134-135) follows Kernaghan (2003) and the Canadian “Task Force on Public Service Values and Ethics 1996” in their conceptual distinction between democratic values (e.g., serving the common good), professional values (e.g., impartiality), general ethical values

(e.g., honesty), and people values (e.g., kindness). Pollitt argues that such a distinction “helps us to understand how and why value conflicts occur” (p. 135). Pollitt also discusses possible tensions between traditional public values and NPM but does not relate values to organizational design.

Van Wart (1998) distinguishes between five classes of values: individual values, professional values, organizational values, legal values, and public interest values. The basic idea behind this classification is the value *source*: the individual, profession, organization, legal framework, and conceptions of the public interest. While Van Wart does not link values and organizational design, he does link the five classes of values to five commandments to the public manager, such as being efficient and effective with the public resources.

Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman (2007) identify more than 60 values related to seven overall value constellations: the contribution of the public sector to society, transformation of interests to decisions, relationships between politicians and administrators, relationships between public administrators and their environment, intraorganizational aspects of public administration, behaviour of public sector employees, and relationship between public administration and the citizens. Within each constellation, one or several value dimensions are specified, each dimension consisting of a number of specific values. In this way, a high number of values are related to all parts or relations in the “public landscape”. The classification itself, however, has no connections to organizational design. Rather, it can be seen as a reservoir of possibly relevant values when considering organizational design.

We suggest that an ordering of public values can benefit from starting with a typology of organizational principles from which values are derived. The advantage of this approach is that it enables empirical research to identify not only links between values and organizational principles but also value conflicts and organizational design conflicts (Beck Jørgensen & Vrangbæk, forthcoming).

Based on Vrangbæk (2009) and Beck Jørgensen (1993), we differentiate between four types of governance: hierarchical, clan, network, and market governance. We then link these organizational design principles to value foundations.

The *hierarchical* principle is based on classical (Weberian) bureaucracy with a strong orientation towards following rules, due process, and neutrality (March & Olsen, 1995; Olsen, 1978; Weber, 1991). The classical bureaucrat is expected to be loyal to their superiors and neutral, transparently following the rule in the hierarchy. The archetype of traditional bureaucracy emphasizes legality, but awareness of economic consequences has also become more important for bureaucrats. Keeping within the budget can also be seen as an important “rule”. The basic esprit is formed by an understanding of the unique role of public employees as servants of the democratic system and, in a broader sense, as representing a general public interest. In sum, the hierarchical principle implies that rules should be followed and budgets kept in order to serve the general public. The desirable thus ultimately becomes a question of compliance with superiors and their rules. In a democratically based hierarchy, the ultimate “superior” is the voting population.

The *clan* is the second principle upon which government can be based, as several classical studies illustrate (e.g., Mintzberg, 1979; Ouchi, 1979). This approach relies on the establishment of norms and internalization of goals in the relevant group. In Western Europe, the relevant group is often a profession; that is, an occupation with intra-occupational norms and specialized, theoretical knowledge in the given area. The professions enforce the professional standards (norms within the profession) via peer review, and the desirable is compliance with intra-occupational norms, making professional commitment very important. Although professions are the most important (modern) example of the clan principle of governance, the clan principle also applies to other groups (e.g., based on family relations or ethnicity). From the clan perspective, desirability is centred on compliance with the norms within the relevant group.

The third principle upon which government can be based, *network* governance, emphasizes how all societal interests must be included in government and policy. Public sector organizations are accordingly seen as elements in complex networks of different interest organizations and groupings (Klijn, 2005; Pierre, 2000; Rhodes, 1997). The state is both an arena and a player in such networks. This means that important values relate to process dimensions of negotiation, balancing interests, and securing fair conditions for all groups, including current

minority political actors. The staff working in such environments ought to have a strong ability to interpret the signals and intentions of other actors. The network perspective is thus highly political, and balancing all societal interests is desirable in itself.

Finally, *market* ideas and private sector management have also been introduced as a principle upon which government and policy can be based (Hood, 1991; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000). The basic idea is that the market as an allocative mechanism is desirable in public organizations (Hood, 1991; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000). To succeed in a market, the potential customers (users of public services) must demand services, and goods and services must be supplied in a cost-efficient manner. The central aspects are serving the user/customer combined with traditional business values, such as productivity. Seen through the lens of the market perspective, desirability is thus closely linked to the supply and demand of public services.

Table 1 sums up the key aspects of the four governance forms. The governance forms can be elaborated further by describing the basic understanding of the role of public organizations, the role of citizens, the organizational context, and the typical control forms within each mode. We can also suggest a number of central values for each governance form. These value expectations will be further elaborated below, while the empirical analysis will reveal whether they hold up or other clusters might be formed.

**Table 1. Characteristics of different modes of governance**

Mode of Governance	Role of Public Organizations	Role of Citizens	Organizational Context	Control Forms	Central values
<b>Hierarchy</b>	Implementation of hierarchical decisions	Voter and subject	Political bodies, central departments, General Audit Office, The ombudsman	"Comptrol", hierarchy, rules	Judicial values/Due process - Accountability towards society in general - Public insight and transparency

<b>Clan</b>	Safeguarding specific purposes, principles, standards and values	Legally protected, guided and socialized individual	Professional associations, universities, knowledge centres, non-economic interest groups	Peer group control, socialization, institutional rivalry	Independent professional standards
<b>Network</b>	Mediator incorporate structures and networks	Member of interest organizations, boards, councils, networks	Industrial interest organizations, labour market organizations, boards, councils, networks, user groups	Negotiations, countervailing powers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Balance societal interests</li> <li>- Make network</li> <li>- User democracy</li> </ul>
<b>Market</b>	Act as a business firm	Consumer	Competitors	Competition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Satisfy users' needs</li> <li>- Productivity</li> <li>- Businesslike operations</li> </ul>

Before these principles can be accepted as a starting point for classifying public values, we must consider two questions. First, how does this classification relate to the existing theory within the discipline of public administration? Second, are the principles exclusive and comprehensive in the context in which the classification is meant to be used?

First, the literature discusses several typologies on modes of governance. For example, Freidson (2001) distinguishes between bureaucracy, professions, and market, and they fall within our class (bureaucracy within hierarchy, professions within the clan principle, and market of course within the market principle). De Bruijn and Dicke (2006) apply hierarchy, network and market in their analysis of how to safeguard public values in liberalized utility sectors which corresponds easily with our typology. Lundquist's typology of market-based, negotiation-based and citizen-based organizational principles also relates to the market, network, and bureaucracy forms. Our typology is thus clearly based on previous works within the public administration literature but provides an independent elaboration of categories.

The second question is whether the typology is exclusive and comprehensive. We argue that it is comprehensive in the sense that it covers most of the ground. Other similar (although not identical) typologies suggest that we are dealing with fundamental forms of governance (cf. Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987; Hood & Schuppert, 1988; March & Olsen, 1989; Rothstein, 1997). The issue of exclusivity is more problematic. The typology can be seen as exclusive at the overall level, but when we enter the messy world of more specific governance elements, we find examples where classification within one overall governance form can be ambiguous. This is particularly clear for the “clan” governance form, which is based on professions and professional values typically found among key professions such as medical doctors but can arguably also be found in a professional corps of bureaucrats with shared ideas concerning their professional role. In the even messier world of practical reality, we observe similar problems of transient and hybrid forms, also suggesting that value conflicts are part of the everyday life of administration. Our conclusion is that each study must deal with these borderline issues, both conceptually and empirically, on its own terms. Although many governance elements can readily be placed within the categories, it is probably neither possible nor useful to attempt a once-and-for-all subdivision of all of the elements, as their interpretation is sensitive to specific cultural and historical contexts.

### **Data and methods**

The classification will be further developed by combining the abovementioned theoretical considerations with empirical data in the form of a survey of public managers. The population consists of 335 Danish public managers employed in central or local government, self-governing public institutions etc. who attended one of two parallel master’s programs in public governance in the autumn of 2009/spring 2010. The first program is managed jointly by the University of Copenhagen and Copenhagen Business School, while the other is managed by Aarhus University and the University of Southern Denmark. The participants in both programs typically have a degree in teaching, nursing, engineering, or an equivalent, and the master’s program is designed to support them theoretically in their current jobs as public managers. Table 2 shows the total number of respondents and response rates.

[TABLE 2 here]

At the University of Copenhagen and Copenhagen Business School, a paper version of the questionnaire was mailed to the participants, and the results were used in the courses. This proved to be a very effective data collection method, resulting in a response rate of 100%. In the other master's program, the questionnaire was mailed to each of the participants together with a letter from the leaders of the master's program explaining the purpose of the survey. Even though return envelopes were provided, this procedure resulted in a lower response rate.

Since the mentioned value typology based on forms of governance has previously proved useful in Danish empirical research (Vrangbæk, 2009), we used it as the basis for formulating questions which were expected to reflect the four principles upon which government can be based. Subsequently, we have analyzed the data in order to construct indexes for consistent value dimensions, testing the extent to which they correspond to the suggested values typology. The items consisted of questions asking the respondents to evaluate the importance of different specific values in relation to the organization, staff competences, and staff motives. Examples are political loyalty, being able to interpret the political climate and signals, and professional commitment as motive. The staff competences are gerunds (-ing form) in the text, whereas the term "as a motive" marks desirable staff motives. The relevant part of the questionnaire is presented in the appendix.

## **Results**

The first step is to carry out an analysis of the investigated public values to see which consistent dimensions they form and whether these dimensions relate to the principles discussed above. Table 3 shows which values we expected to be associated with the principles, and table 4 is a principal component analysis, showing the patterns we actually found.

TABLE 3 here

TABLE 4 here

Seven components with eigenvalues above 1 (i.e., the component explains more than the average item) were extracted. With one exception, the specific values with high loadings on the same

dimension (indicating that they are positively associated) were also expected to belong to the same principle. The exception relates to the first component. It has high loadings on four items (political loyalty, being able to interpret the political climate, balancing societal interests, and making networks). The former was expected to be linked to the hierarchical principle, and the second could be either linked to hierarchy or networking, depending on the specific perception of politicians, while the other two were expected to be linked to networks. The fact that *political loyalty* is part of this dimension may indicate that the investigated public leaders associate political loyalty with a role as mediators and networkers balancing societal interests, making networks, and interpreting the political climate. The leaders recognize that they operate in political environments and that loyalty to their formal political superiors is a key rule of the game before acting within the network environment forming their operational field. In a sense, politicians may be seen as one group of actors among many others or as representatives of the different external interests that ought to be balanced. At the same time, however, some politicians have a formal position, which commands loyalty. We therefore label the first dimension “societal interest” and classify it under the network principle.

The logical consequence of placing “political loyalty” within this category is that elected and responsible politicians are not seen as part of the hierarchy in the hierarchical governance form. This suggests replacing the term “hierarchy” with “bureaucracy”, as the remaining items within this heading are more closely linked to traditional operating values for the administration (budget keeping, due process, and accountability). Incidentally, this divergence from the traditional understanding of the role of the politician is aptly illustrated by a quote from a manager in a Danish municipality. She explained in an interview: “We consider the local government and the politicians to be our colleagues. After all, the politicians are a natural part of the public sector” (Quoted from Lindermann & Beck Jørgensen, 2003: 172 our translation). Considering politicians to be colleagues indicates that they are not seen as hierarchically superior but rather as part of the general network environment. Viewing politicians as “natural parts” of the public sector further underlines how, for practical purposes, the concept of a politically governed public hierarchy is not a dominating perspective for this particular manager. We suggest that our data reflects this view.

The other six components in table 4 can be much more easily categorized in terms of principles. The second dimension in table 4 thus has high loadings for *independent professional standards, having professional drive, and professional commitment as motive*, and they all concern professions. We call this dimension “professionalism” and argue that it is linked to the clan principle. Component 3 has high loadings for *satisfying user’s needs, good relations to users as motive, and user democracy*. They all concern the users of the services, and the component is accordingly referred to as “user focus”. The two first items in this group clearly concerns the demand for services, and can thus unambiguously be interpreted within a market perspective. Our initial theoretical understanding of user democracy was as part of a network perspective (see table 1 and 3). Yet, the empirical observations led us to reinterpret the item as an institutionalized mechanism for feedback, which complements other forms of feedback in the relationship between public service users and providers, and thus to include it within the market perspective.

Supply of services also appears to be captured by one of the components in table 4 (no. 6). It has high loadings for *businesslike operations and high productivity*, and we call it efficient supply. The last three components (nos. 4, 5 and 7) are seen as belonging to hierarchy as a principle. Component 4 has high loadings on *stay within budget as a motive and having economic awareness*, and it is referred to as budget keeping. Component 5 has high loadings for *judicial values/due process and being loyal to rules* and is accordingly labelled rule abidance. Finally, component 7 has high loadings on accountability towards society and public insight and transparency. Given that both relate to the interest of the entire community, we label this dimension “the public at large”. These dimensions are relatively *consistent*, and it is also possible to form relatively reliable indexes for them based on the items mentioned above (corresponding to the shaded cells in table 4)<sup>1</sup>. The question is, however, whether the classification is comprehensive, exclusive, and fruitful.

The empirical analysis indicates (1) that the four principles are comprehensive (all of the dimensions containing public values selected for this study can be placed within one of them), but (2) that they may not be sufficiently exclusive, as some items have characteristics that render their placement ambiguous. This became particularly evident for the items “political loyalty” and

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<sup>1</sup> Given that most of them only consist of two items, the reliability is not quite satisfactory (see table A1 for Cronbach’s alpha for the different indexes). Future research ought to include more items to measure each dimension.

“ability to interpret the political climate”. The empirical analysis indicated how managers see them as mostly related to other items within the “network” principle, while we expected them to be more closely connected to items within the “hierarchical” principle.

Lastly, it is also relevant whether the classification is fruitful in terms of differentiating between fundamentally different values and allowing for interesting analyses of important relationships. In order to evaluate the fruitfulness, we present empirical evidence concerning two questions: First, how are these dimensions related to one another? Is there a pattern in the relationships between the value dimensions, and can this pattern be linked back to the four principles? Second, how fruitful are the dimensions (and the four principles behind them) in terms of understanding the value differences found within the public sector?

To find out how the dimensions are related, we begin by performing a principal component analysis of the mentioned additive indexes. Table 5 reveals a strong general component (no. 1), which can be interpreted as the general tendency to see all public values as important. However, the second component is more interesting. It reveals how the dimensions differ, consistently corresponding to the principles upon which we have argued that they are based.

[table 5 here]


At the one end are professionalism and user focus while societal interests are at the other (user focus has a slightly higher loading than professionalism; otherwise the ordering is as illustrated in figure 1). In other words, the four principles actually seem to differentiate between systematically differing value dimensions. But how do the value dimensions relate to one another?

The strong first component in table 5 indicates how the bivariate correlations between the value dimensions are of limited relevance, because the general tendency to answer that all values are important will conceal the interesting findings (table B2 in Appendix B contains these correlations and confirms that all of the correlations are positive). Table 6 shows the same correlations controlled for response set. For each correlation, we constructed an index of the scores of all of the other investigated items in table 4 (except the items which are part of the two indexes in question) and used this measure of the general tendency to answer that all values are important as a control variable.

[table 6 here]

The pattern in the correlations in table 6 confirms that the four principles (hierarchy, clan, network and market) can be ordered as illustrated in figure 1. 'The public at large' is positively correlated with 'user focus', 'rule abidance', and 'societal interests'. 'Rule abidance' is positively correlated with 'the public at large' and 'societal interests'. 'Societal interests' is positively correlated with 'rule abidance' and 'budget keeping' (and negatively correlated with 'professionalism'), and 'budget keeping' is positively correlated with 'societal interests' and 'efficient supply'. 'Efficient supply' is positively correlated with 'budget keeping' and 'professionalism', and 'professionalism' is positively correlated with 'efficient supply' and 'user focus'. Finally, 'user focus' is positively correlated with 'professionalism' and 'the public at large'. The only correlation, which is significantly negative, is between professionalism and societal interests, and this confirms that the principles of clan and network differ most. This may be due to the contrast between "who should decide". The clan perspective implies that decisions should (narrowly) be taken by the relevant group, based on norms (specifically for professions on intra-occupational norms based on professional knowledge), and the network perspective implies that all societal groups (very broadly) should be included in the process. Using these results, we can construct the following two-dimensional figure (figure 1).

Figure 1: Correlations between the seven empirically derived items



We initially expected a correlation between the values within the four organizational groups. Indeed, such internal consistency was part of our initial evaluation criteria for classifications. How can we explain that e.g. rule abidance and budget keeping are not closely correlated? Our guess is that the vertical axis in the figure deals with the practical challenges related to pursuing the different values within the same category at the same time. In the case of rule abidance and budget keeping, one can easily imagine conflicts between granting services according to established rights (rule abidance) and working within a fixed budget (budget keeping). Once the budget is used up, the public service provider faces a serious dilemma of either skimping on services or not being able to keep the budget.

This example illustrates the general point that items may be theoretically organized within the ideal typical governance forms as argued above, but when it comes to the practical pursuit of the values, internal tensions within the main categories seem to exist. Our responses reflect these tensions, such as between pursuing efficient supply and user focus at the same time, and between serving the public in general, abiding to all rules, and keeping within budget, which may occasionally require the rules to be bent according to shifting practical contingencies. This

apparent challenge to the consistency based on our empirical analysis does not lead us to reject the ideal typical classification. On the contrary, we suggest that the empirical results provide interesting insights into the potential for practical and “real life” tensions between values within the four main principles that are otherwise theoretically consistent.

Thus, value conflicts not only occur because most public organizations and sectors are organized with elements from more than one form of governance. Our empirical analysis shows that even within the pure form, administrators face value conflicts. These external and internal value conflicts and the possible interplay between them calls for what Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981, 1983) and Quinn and Cameron (1983) aptly phrased as the Competing Values Approach. As we accumulate more studies based on our classification, we can better discern patterns of such internal value conflicts and theorize about value trade offs. During time, this may even lead to the reassessment of the theoretically derived ideal types.

The next question is how fruitful the classification is in terms of understanding differences within the public sector. To analyze this, we have examined the value differences in different types of public organizations in order to see whether the value dimensions differentiate between organizations. Table 7 compares the average scores on the value dimensions in organizations providing services (social care, health, education, research, and cultural service) with organizations with regulative tasks (e.g., justice and tax collection). The differences are clear and in accordance with the literature (Vrangbæk, 2003): Public leaders in regulative organizations think that rule abidance (and considering societal interests) is more important, whereas public leaders in service delivery organizations score higher on the professionalism and user focus indexes. Again, the classification based on principles captures this difference, and the pattern is consistent.

[table 7 here]

The same pattern is found when comparing public authorities (e.g., ministries, central agencies, local town hall bureaucracies) with public delivery organizations (e.g., schools and hospitals). Table 8 shows how public leaders employed in bodies of authority attach greater importance to rule abidance and to considering and balancing societal interests, whereas public leaders employed in

public agencies score higher on professionalism and user focus. Again, the results follow the logic in the classification of values.

[table 8 here]

## **Conclusion**

The paper set out to develop a classification of values. Based on empirical evidence and theoretical input, we have proposed that public values can be classified in seven dimensions relating to four forms of governance (hierarchy, clan, network and market). The seven public value dimensions are called 'the public at large', rule abidance, societal interests, budget keeping, efficient supply, professionalism, and user focus.

The classification of forms of governance is based on theory, given that similar categorizations have been suggested by other authors and that each of the forms has been elaborated by reference to previous typologies. Our empirical data indicate that it is comprehensive in the context in which it was used, but not necessarily exclusive in all empirical situations, as the four forms of governance are subject to contextual interpretations and thus do not necessarily constitute mutually exclusive classes in all cases. Our suggestion based on our limited empirical data is that the classification should be refined concerning the view of politicians as either part of the public hierarchy or as representing societal interests, and that user democracy can be reinterpreted as a mechanism for users to convey their opinions to public service providers within a market

The internal consistency within the four governance forms was also debated based on our empirical results. While we conclude that the consistency is challenged, this should not lead to rejection of the typology at the present time. On the contrary, it can be seen as a strength that we are able to use empirical analysis to tease out patterns of practical or "real life" tensions and value conflicts within the theoretically consistent governance forms.

The more general conclusion is that the classification appears relatively robust but that the four governance forms should be seen as ideal types, while the more specific empirical results can vary from setting to setting. As we accumulate more studies using these concepts, we can establish more firm patterns of relationships. Nevertheless, the classification appears fruitful

in terms of differentiating between different values and illuminating interesting differences between different public organizations. The classification can therefore be helpful in future analyses of the desirable, thus allowing a more precise analysis of competing values and the dynamic forces resulting from these tensions. In that way we may develop a realistic and theoretically satisfying understanding of the public sector compared to New Public Management which tend to concentrate on one (easily measured) public value dimension, thereby in fact presenting itself as a special case within a broader public value framework.

The present study of value dimensions has obvious limitations. First, further work on ensuring that the network and hierarchical perspectives as well as the network and market perspectives (in regards to user democracy) are mutually exclusive classes is, as mentioned, warranted. Second, the discussion above treats values as abstract entities, but we must remember that values first attain their actual significance in the concrete situation (West & Davies, 2011). The room for the interpretation of values is usually considerable, which is both their strength and weakness. Surveys are generally poorly suited for capturing differences in interpretations, and there is a risk of the response not being reflected on other levels. It will be interesting to see whether the same patterns can be identified when using other methodologies to uncover the multi-faceted interpretations in the time and space of public values. Combinations of surveys with document studies, e.g., content analysis of job advertisements (Beck Jørgensen & Rutgers, 2011) or official documents (Beck Jørgensen, Vrangbæk, & Sørensen, 2009) and qualitative interviews would thus strengthen our understanding of value patterns. Especially, case studies and interviewing could help us understanding value conflicts and value trade offs and how these are handled in concrete situations. Regardless of these challenges, we think that the classification can be used to link public values more systematically to other related concepts and constitutes a useful step towards a better understanding of value conflicts.

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Table 2: Total number and response rates for participants in the Danish public management master's program

<b>Master's program</b>	<b>Number of participants</b>	<b>Number of responses received</b>	<b>Response rate</b>
Aarhus University in cooperation with the University of Southern Denmark	140	79	56.5%
University of Copenhagen in cooperation with Copenhagen Business School	195	195	100%
<b>Total</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>274</b>	<b>81.8%</b>

Table 3: Initial expectations as to how specific values relate to the principles upon which government and policy can be based

	<b>Hierarchy</b>	<b>Clan/profession</b>	<b>Network</b>	<b>Market</b>
<b>General values</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Political loyalty</li> <li>- Judicial values/Due process</li> <li>- Accountability towards society in general</li> <li>- Public insight and transparency</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Independent professional standards</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Balance societal interests</li> <li>- Make network</li> <li>- User democracy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Satisfy users' needs</li> <li>- Productivity</li> <li>- Businesslike operations</li> </ul>
<b>Values regarding staff skills</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Being loyal to rules</li> <li>- Having economic awareness</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Having professional drive</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Being able to interpret the political climate and signals</li> </ul>	
<b>Values regarding staff motives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Stay within the budget as motive</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Professional commitment as motive</li> <li>- Recognition from peers as motive</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Good relations to users as motive</li> </ul>

Table 4: Principal component analysis of items potentially reflecting principles upon which government can be based. Loadings.

Items:	Extracted components						
	1. Societal interests	2. Professionalism	3. User focus	4. Budget keeping	5. Rule abidance	6. Efficient supply	7. The public at large
Political loyalty	.606	-.119	-.023	-.141	.450	-.044	.175
Being able to interpret political climate	.565	-.163	-.208	-.344	.208	-.036	-.046
Balance societal interests	.814	.151	.166	.095	-.044	.152	-.034
Make network	.368	-.169	.086	-.121	-.280	-.380	-.312
Independent professional standards	-.064	.445	-.110	.222	.111	-.192	-.386
Having professional drive	.218	.673	.129	-.073	-.124	-.198	-.148
Professional commitment as motive	-.045	.851	-.015	-.133	.114	.095	.144
Satisfy users' needs	.011	.007	.679	.133	.084	-.033	.208
User democracy	.127	-.125	.632	-.011	-.011	-.267	-.117
Good relations to users as motive	.022	.137	.659	-.073	-.162	.077	-.096
Having economic awareness	.033	.050	-.102	-.845	-.117	-.045	-.048
Stay within budget as motive	-.041	.091	.039	-.771	.079	-.105	.098
Judicial values/Due process	.226	-.024	-.163	.045	.609	-.073	-.143
Being loyal to rules	-.045	.119	.089	-.031	.812	-.102	-.040
High productivity	-.213	-.052	.088	-.065	.249	-.758	-.018
Businesslike operations	.009	.148	.023	-.110	-.029	-.755	.081
Accountability towards society	.028	.004	-.057	.031	.065	.031	-.836
Public insight and transparency	-.178	-.030	.408	-.299	.335	.252	-.448

Note: Pattern matrix. 7 factors with an eigenvalue above 1 were extracted (highest eigenvalues from left to right). Extraction: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

Table 5. Principle component analysis of value dimensions

	Component 1	Component 2
Societal interests index	0.639	-0.438
Rule abidance index	0.560	-0.327
Budget keeping index	0.626	-0.265
Efficient supply index	0.597	0.097
The public at large index	0.633	0.185
User focus index	0.354	0.667
Professionalism index	0.393	0.557

Table 6: Correlations between public values indexes controlled for response-set

	The public at large index	Rule abidance index	Societal interests index	Budget keeping index	Efficient supply index	Professionalism index
The public at large index	1.000					
Rule abidance index	0.138 * 242	1.000				
Societal interests index	0.197 ** 240	0.210 ** 248	1.000			
Budget keeping index	0.043 247	0.087 258	0.310 *** 251	1.000		
Efficient supply index	-0.008 238	0.116 249	0.114 244	0.177 ** 253	1.000	
Professionalism index	0.079 249	0.077 260	-0.143 * 254	0.059 264	0.199 ** 255	1.000 254
User focus index	0.223 *** 239	-0.116 248	0.030 246	0.005 251	0.112 242	0.142 * 254

Note: \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001, missing values are replaced with mean value of the other respondents

Table 7: Mean scores on value dimensions for respondents working in regulative and service-providing organizations

	<b>Task of respondent's organization</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean score on value dimension</b>	<b>Direction of difference</b>	<b>Significance of difference</b>
Societal interests index	Regulation/administration	66	71.4015	Reg/adm. highest	
	Service provision	165	67.1591		
Rule abidance index	Regulation/administration	67	90.2985	Reg/adm. highest	***
	Service provision	170	81.5441		
The public at large index	Regulation/administration	66	71.7172		
	Service provision	162	73.2510		
Budget keeping index	Regulation/administration	67	60.6343		
	Service provision	174	63.0029		
Efficient supply index	Regulation/administration	65	75.7692		
	Service provision	168	76.8601		
Professionalism index	Regulation/administration	68	89.8284	Service highest	**
	Service provision	175	93.9048		
User focus index	regulering/administration	65	65.5128	Service highest	***
	service	168	76.2897		

Note: Only differences higher than 3 points (on scales between 0 and 100) are marked.

Table 8: Mean scores on value dimensions for respondents working in authorities and agencies

	Type of organization	N	Mean score on value dimension	Direction of difference	Significance of difference
Societal interests index	Authority	116	74.918	Authority	***
	Agency	127	64.0748	highest	
Rule abidance index	Authority	121	88.8430	Authority	***
	Agency	128	80.3711	highest	
The public at large index	Authority	114	73.5380		
	Agency	124	72.7151		
Budget keeping index	Authority	120	64.4792		
	Agency	133	61.0902		
Efficient supply index	Authority	118	77.2246		
	Agency	128	77.4414		
User focus index	Authority	118	71.1158	Agency	*
	Agency	125	75.3333	highest	
Professionalism index	Authority	122	90.5055	Agency	**
	Agency	134	94.2786	highest	

Note: Only differences higher than 3 points (on scales between 0 and 100) are marked.

## Appendix A: Questionnaire concerning values, motives and competences in the public sector

### 1. How important do you think these values *should be* in your organization?

Please mark one option in each row	Fundamental, very important	Should normally be important	Should occasionally be important	Shouldn't be important	Shouldn't play any role	Don't know
A. Political loyalty						
B. Judicial values/Due process						
C. Independent professional standards (freedom to use professional discretion in a qualified manner)						
D. Balance societal interests (e.g., considering special interests without letting them dominate)						
E. Satisfying immediate needs of users						
F. High productivity						
G. Businesslike operations						
H. Accountability to society in general						
I. Public insight and transparency (citizens and others can always ask questions and look us over the shoulder)						
J. Listen to the public opinion (ensure alignment between public opinion and our activity)						
K. Equal treatment (avoid discrimination based on gender, ethnicity and religion in encounters with users or recruitment)						
L. Continuity (look at the long term and maintain traditions)						
M. Innovation						
N. Ensure good career opportunities for employees						
O. Strengthen user democracy (e.g., help users gain influence using existing channels or creating new ones)						
P. Networking (moving beyond sector limits and traditional jurisdictions)						
Q. Other values, please specify:						

**2. In your opinion, how *should* core employees in a public organization rate the importance of the following competences?**

<b>Please mark one option in each row</b>	Should be fundamental; very important	Should normally be important	Should occasionally be important	Shouldn't be important	Shouldn't play any role	Don't know
A. Ability to interpret the political climate and signals						
B. Ethical awareness						
C. Willingness to take risks						
D. Loyalty to rules						
E. Adaptability						
F. Personal integrity (e.g., honesty and credibility)						
G. Professional drive						
H. Economic awareness						
J. Strong interpersonal skills						
I. Ability to innovate						
K. Other competences, please specify:						

**3. In your opinion, how *should* core employees in a public organization rate the importance of the following motives?**

<b>Please mark one option in each row</b>	Should be extremely important	Should be very important	Should be fairly important	Should be less important	Shouldn't be important	Don't know
A. Professional commitment						
B. Commitment to the organizational task/mission						
C. Good social work environment						
D. A high salary						
E. Career opportunities						
F. Staying within budget						
G. Good relations with higher authorities						
H. Learning and development on the job						
I. Recognition from management						
J. Good relations to users						
K. Recognition from peers						
L. Other types of motives, please specify:						

Appendix B

Table B1: Correlations between public values indexes controlled for response-set

	The public at large index	Rule abidance index	Societal interests index	Budget keeping index	Efficient supply index	Professionalism index
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Note