

Models of public service provision – When will Knights and Knaves be responsive to Pawns and Queens?[¥]

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Abstract

Le Grand (2003) started a new research agenda when he argued that employee motivation and user capacity are important for public service provision. Although research on employee motivation thrives (especially the public service motivation (PSM) literature), few studies investigate user capacity empirically, and this paper sets out to analyse how public service motivation and user capacity vary across service areas. We develop and apply a new measure of user capacity called 'Public Service Efficacy' (PSE), while we use an existing measure of PSM to investigate the motivation of the individual public service providers. Additionally, we discuss the implications for the responsiveness in four central service areas (day-care, schools, hospitals and universities) under different models of service provision. We argue that the combination of employee motivation, user capacity and models of public service provision (trust, mistrust, voice and choice) is very important for responsiveness.

JEL Classification: H11, J45, M5.

Keywords: Public Service provision models, Public Service Motivation, public service efficacy, paternalism, voice, choice, mistrust, trust

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1. Introduction

The literature on the design of public policy has long discussed the roles of motivation and agency. Recently, public service provision has been theorized as being populated by ‘knights’ and ‘knaves’, who deliver services to ‘pawns’ and ‘queens’ (Le Grand, 2003; 2007; 2010). Thus, Le Grand argues that public service providers range from knights to knaves, who possess varying degrees of Public Service Motivation (PSM), i.e. orientation to do good for others and society in the provision of public services (Perry and Hondeghem, 2008), and that users of public services range from ‘pawns’ to ‘queens’ –who possess varying degrees of user capacity, i.e. capacity to undertake actions to reach internal desires or preferences (Le Grand, 2003). Most scholars agree that public service providers are neither pure “knights” who want to do good for society and others nor pure knaves, who act self-seekingly with guile (Williamson, 1985; Le Grand, 2003; 2010). Similarly, few users are totally without capacity or perfectly able to control the services they use. Both employee motivation and user capacity are, in other words, a question of degree. The emerging literature on Public Service Motivation (PSM) provides an empirical measure which is well suited to analyse this type of motivation (Perry, 1996; Coursey et al., 2007; Kim, 2010). However, no similar measure exists for user agency and less is known about users of public services. We do not know to what extent they are able to act as queens, who can move freely and make qualified choices between public services and speak up to the public service providers, or to what extent they act as pawns, who passively receive the services delivered. And we do not have empirical measures which are suited to analyse this. Even if the conceptualisation of pawns and queens has received much attention, it has not been subject to much empirical investigation (see however, Matosevic et al., 2008). This is an important gap in the literature. If the levels of PSM and user capacity vary between service-areas this may have implications for how suitable different models of service provision are. Therefore, it is

highly relevant to analyse empirically where the knights and knaves, pawns and queens of public service provision are found, and how PSM and user capacity vary between service areas.

Models of service-provision can be evaluated according to a number of criteria. Efficiency, effectiveness, equity have been among the central (Le Grand, 1991, but in this paper we focus particularly on what implications variations in PSM and user capacity may have for responsiveness, defined as ‘the speed and accuracy with which a service provider responds to a request for action or information’ (Vigoda, 2002: 529). The reason why we focus on responsiveness is, that variations in the capacities of the users across service areas, which are mapped in this article, may matter to the response users get from providers of public service. Knights may be responding more to the wishes of pawns than knaves who only consider their own interests. Hence variations in user capacity may have implications for how responsiveness should be secured across areas of service provision when variations in PSM and user capacity are found. Furthermore, responsiveness towards users of public services has been high on the NPM reform agenda, and the introduction of new elements of voice and choice have, among other things, been motivated by an increasing demand for responsiveness (Vigoda, 2002).

Thus, this paper sets out to analyse how public service motivation and user capacity vary across service areas and discuss the implications for the responsiveness in four central service areas: day-care, schools, hospitals and universities under different models of service provision.

In order to empirically investigate user capacity, we develop and apply a measure of user capacity called 'Public Service Efficacy' (PSE), while we use an existing measure of PSM to investigate the motivation of the public service providers (Perry, 1996). PSE is inspired by the concept political efficacy (Craig et al., 1990; Niemi et al., 1991) and is defined as the individual user's feeling of competence to understand and affect the

provision of public services by exercising choice and voice (Andersen et al., 2011). Thus, the contributions are (1) development of a new measure of PSE, which is used to analyse variations across service areas in terms of PSE and PSM, (2) mapping of the variation across service areas and (3) discussion of the implication of this variation for responsiveness towards users and politicians under different models of service provision.

The article proceeds as follows: First, the concepts PSM and PSE are presented and related to models of service provision, e.g. voice, choice, trust or mistrust. Second, research design, data and methods are described, and third, results on how PSM and PSE vary between service areas are presented. Fourth, the implications for responsiveness in the investigated service areas are discussed. The conclusion sums up the central findings and discusses the potential for future research.

2. Motivation, agency and responsiveness

A fundamental question for publicly funded services is who has the power to make decisions over the nature of the services, the service quantity and the choice of provider for the services (Le Grand 2003: 74). In this section, we argue that both employee motivation (here conceptualized as PSM) and user capacity (here conceptualized as PSE) are important for this question and therefore for the responsiveness of public service delivery (Le Grand, 2010: 64). Responsiveness can be defined as “the speed and accuracy with which a service provider responds to a request for action or information” (Vigoda, 2002: 529). This being said the literature on responsiveness has been struggling to answer the questions of to whom and to what service providers should respond (Saltzstein, 1992: 65). The enacted environment of the service providers defines possible stakeholders to whom a response can and should be made (Bryer, 2007). Thus service providers can be responsive in several directions, and the goals may very well be conflicting. Firstly, responsiveness can be general and directed to

all of the citizens through the political system. Secondly, it can be specific and directed to individual users or groups of users and stakeholders (Cope, 1997; Du Gay, 2008; Bryer, 2007). Thirdly, service providers can also be responsive towards their own uniquely developed set of professional or public goals (Bryer, 2007: 486).

Responsiveness towards the political system can either be either informal or formal. If responsiveness is formal, politicians direct the character of administrative thought and action (Bryer, 2007), and service providers are required to exhibit ownership and identification with particular policies (Du Gay, 2008). If responsiveness is formal, it is constrained by bureaucratic rules. Here, a desire for efficiency and standard application of rules make bureaucrats seek to ensure that responsiveness does not stray from what is permissible under the established guidelines (Bryer, *ibid.*: 485; Du Gay, 2008). However, everything is seldom regulated by the political level. Service providers normally have discretion to choose between different actions and be more or less responsive to users or to their own goals (Bryer, *ibid.*:486).

Considering responsiveness towards the users, Vigoda (2002:1) argues that the users of public services to a large extent prefer the ‘easy chair of the customer, to the sweat and turmoil of participatory involvement’, and that there is a need to move from the focus on responsiveness as understood in NPM with an emphasis on the customers in the direction of a focus on collaboration where public service provision is to be developed in the direction of meeting user needs. Hence, rather than losing relevance, responsiveness is also becoming a question about how to collaborate and negotiate with different groups in the environment in order to improve public service provision (Bryer, 2007).

The last type of responsiveness is, as mentioned, service providers’ responsiveness towards their own uniquely developed set of professional or public goals (Bryer, 2007: 486). These can be important, especially if they

are paternalistic (think that they know best what is good for society and users (Le Grand, 2010: 65)) and have other views on what the public interests is than the politicians. These other views may be based on professional norms concerning the quality required in service provision. Professionalism may be defined as the occupational level of specialized, theoretical knowledge combined with firm, professional norms (Andersen & Pedersen, 2010). Although it is not the same as paternalism, there is an affinity. Professional norms may specify what the profession sees as constituting the public good and how it should be reached (Bayer, 2008). In that connection, we argue that responsiveness towards service providers' own professional or public goals is based on a desire to provide the 'right' service and thus achieve a good for a population or constituency, and not a on a desire to deny services to users based on preconceived notions (Bryer, 2007, 486) or based on individual self-interest. The professional and public goals of the service providers may differ from the views of users and politicians, but professional norms (and therefore also professional goals) may also be in perfect harmony with users and politicians. It may even be a professional norm to be responsive towards politicians and/or users. We will return to the issue of paternalism later, given that responsiveness towards service providers' own uniquely developed set of professional or public goals is typical to the paternalistic knight in Le Grand's analytical framework (2010).

Responsiveness towards the individual users and 'society in general' can be compatible or clashing, because social needs are sometimes - and sometimes not - an aggregation of user needs. Elected politicians cannot be supposed to always divine social needs and be motivated to meet them, but they can still be seen as the most legitimate expression of social needs in a democratic society. Responsiveness may become illegitimate when not based on legal authority as it is a risk that powerful influences of some may ring out loudly and wrongly represent the interests of the many (Vigoda, 2002: 529). However, there is, as mentioned, often room for discretion in

service provision, and public service providers deal with multiple stakeholders and potentially conflicting demands. How they balance these demands is a matter of responsiveness, which may be influenced by the models of service provision.

We argue theoretically that responsiveness in a given service area depends on the motivation of the service providers, the agency of the users, and the models of public service provision. Before we substantiate this argument, we discuss the concepts separately in the following order: Provider motivation (conceptualized as public service motivation (PSM)), user capacity - conceptualized as public service efficacy (PSE) - and models of public service provision (trust, mistrust, choice and voice).

2.1 Public Service Motivation (PSM)

In Le Grand's terminology individuals possess varying degrees of Public Service Motivation (Le Grand, 2003: Ch.4). Public Service Motivation can be defined as 'an individual's orientation to delivering service to people with the purpose of doing good for others and society' (Hondegheem and Perry, 2009:6). Where Le Grand draws on PSM as a theoretical concept, the literature on PSM has largely been empirical and directed to the development of measures. Perry (1996) identifies four empirical components of the PSM construct: Attraction to Public Policy-making (ATP), Commitment to the Public Interest (CPI), Compassion (COM) and Self-sacrifice (SS). In the empirical analysis in this paper, the PSM concept is confined to include ATP, CPI and COM, while the dimension SS has been excluded due to data availability. Table 1 shows our understanding of the dimensions.

Table 1. Public service motivation (PSM) dimensions

Dimension	Understanding of dimension	Discussed in
Commitment to public interest (CPI)	Motivation to deliver public services to serve the relevant society, based on values and duty	Perry (1996)/Kim & Vandenberg (2009)
Compassion (COM)	Emotionally (empathically) based motivation to do good for others by improving public services	Perry (1996)
Attraction to policy-making (ATP)	Motivation to improve decision-making concerning public services to help others and society	Perry (1996)/Kim & Vandenberg (2009)
Self-sacrifice (SS)	The will to bypass one's own needs to help others and society by providing public services	Perry (1996)

PSM does, as mentioned, concern the motivation originating in aspirations to do good for others and society through public service delivery. But the goals of these efforts – what does it mean to do good for other and society – may very well vary (Andersen et al., 2010). The most basic distinction is between providers with a high degree of paternalism, thinking that they know best what is good for society and users, and providers with a low level of paternalism, thinking that the politicians and/or the users know best (Le Grand, 2010: 65). Two distinctions are thus relevant; the basic distinction between motivation to do good for society and others versus motivation to do good for oneself, and (for persons motivated to do good for society and others) a distinction between different understanding of who should define what doing good means. We thus have three types of service providers: Knaves, paternalistic knights and non-paternalistic knights.

2.2 Public Service Efficacy (PSE)

According to Le Grand (2003) agency is the capacity to undertake actions to reach internal desires or preferences, and Public Service Efficacy (PSE) denotes the capacity to undertake a very specific type of action, namely the action relevant in relation to the provision of public services. PSE is defined as the individual user's feeling of competence to understand and affect the provision of public services by exercising choice and voice. As such it is parallel to the concept PSM in one aspect, namely that the focus is delimited to the provision of public services.

The Public Service Efficacy construct is inspired by the measurement of ‘internal political efficacy’, e.g. the citizens’ feelings of personal competence to understand and to participate effectively in politics (Craig et al., 1990: 290; Niemi et al., 1991: 1407). The internal political efficacy items concern (1) whether people see themselves as qualified to participate, (2) whether they judge that they have a good understanding of the relevant issues, (3) whether they feel that they could hold a public office, (4) whether they feel confident discussing politics, and (5) whether they consider themselves well informed (Craig et al., 1990: 308; Niemi et al., 1991: 1408). In line with this, the items on PSE measure perceived qualification, understanding, potential participation in user boards and information across service areas (see the paragraph on data and methods for the full wording of the items).

The users’ perception of their capacity will influence how they use voice and choice in service provision. If they have a low PSE, they can be seen as pawns who do not move freely, but in contrast are passive receivers of services. If PSE is high, the users can be seen as queens, who are able to speak up to service providers and choose as they like.

2.3 Models of service provision: Trust, mistrust, voice and choice

Le Grand distinguishes between four models of models of public service provision: voice and choice; trust and mistrust. In the following these models are shortly described in their ideal form, but they are often combined for specific service areas.

In the voice model the users can express their dissatisfaction or satisfaction by some form of direct communication with the service providers (Le Grand, 2010:64). The argument behind the model is that high-quality public service requires that service providers listen to the users and adhere to their needs. Examples of voice models are user boards and citizen satisfaction surveys, though satisfaction surveys also can provide information to the users who exercise a choice between different providers. The choice model

– in contrast - involves the individual users’ freedom of choice between different public service providers. This can be between a public provider and one or more private providers, but it can also be between different public providers. In the trust model, providers of the services, e.g. the doctors, school-teachers or nursery teachers, are trusted to spend the budget professionally. They are presumed to allocate the budget so that public service provision is efficient, responsive, accountable, equitable and of high quality (Le Grand, 2010: 58). In doing so, they are not subject to government directives and sanctions and do not get rewards linked to their performance. In this model, public service providers are seen as 'knights' who seek to provide the best possible public service to the benefit of society at large. In contrast, the mistrust model – or ‘command-and-control’ as it also is called – is based on a hierarchy of control, top-steering, coupled with external rewards or penalties for compliance or failure to comply with central directives (Le Grand, 2010: 60). In this model, public service providers are not trusted to do their jobs properly without intervention. The service providers are seen as ‘knaves’, and financial incentives, promotion and ‘naming and shaming’, where poor performers are exposed, are used to control the (supposedly self-interested) employees.

Both the trust and the mistrust models concern government’s relationship with the organizations and individuals that provide public services. The voice and choice models on the other hand concern the relationship between the users and the providers (organizations as well as individuals). This means that choice and voice can be combined with both trust and mistrust. Service areas with user choice for example may or may not have activity-based reimbursement, and there may or may not be sanctions for bad performance in user satisfaction surveys. Some combinations are more frequently seen in practice, but they are all logically possible. Below, we discuss how these combinations relate to responsiveness for different types of public service providers.

2.4 Implications of variations in PSE and PSM for responsiveness under voice and choice

This section discusses how variations in PSM and PSE relate to responsiveness under different models of public service provision. Below, table 4 presents what implications provider motivation is expected to have for responsiveness for the logical combinations of choice, voice and trust/mistrust. The table reads as follows: The columns concern the relationship between the users and the service providing organizations and individuals and hence show different combinations of choice and voice. There are four possibilities. Either, both choice and voice mechanisms exist, voice exists, but not choice, choice exists, but not voice, or neither choice nor voice exists. The rows concern the service providers, who can be knights – paternalistic or non-paternalistic – or knaves. The content of the table shows the implications for responsiveness under these different conditions if the relationship between the political level and the providers of public service is based on trust or mistrust respectively. Knights (paternalistic or non-paternalistic) and knaves are presented here as stylized ideal types in order to make the picture clear, although they cannot be expected to exist in their pure form. The more realistic assumption is that people are neither knights nor knaves, but that different combinations of motivation exist in different contexts.

Table 2: The implications of provider motivation and model of service provision for user and political responsiveness.

	Both choice and voice exist	Voice exists but not choice	Choice exists but not voice	Neither voice or choice exists
Non-paternalistic knights	Trust: High responsiveness Mistrust: High responsiveness	Trust: High responsiveness Mistrust: High responsiveness	Trust: Medium/high responsiveness Mistrust: Medium/high responsiveness	Trust: Medium responsiveness Mistrust: Medium responsiveness
Paternalistic knights	Trust: Low/medium responsiveness Mistrust: Medium responsiveness	Trust: Low/medium responsiveness Mistrust: Low/medium responsiveness	Trust: Low/medium responsiveness Mistrust: Medium responsiveness	Trust: Low responsiveness Mistrust: Low responsiveness
Knaves	Trust: Not responsive Mistrust: Some political responsiveness, but opportunism. High user responsiveness if incentives or sanctions depend on user voice/choice	Trust: Not responsive Mistrust: Some political responsiveness, but opportunism. Some user responsiveness if incentives or sanctions depend on compliance with voice	Trust: Not responsive Mistrust: Some political responsiveness, but opportunism. High user responsiveness if incentives or sanctions depend on user choice	Trust: Not responsive Mistrust: Some political responsiveness, but opportunism User responsiveness is random and depends on accordance with the interests of politicians and service providers.

Knives (see table 4 last row) are not expected to be responsive at all in trust models, because selfish individuals only react to suggestions and influences, if this affects their own utility. This happens in the mistrust model as compliance/non-compliance is rewarded or sanctioned. In mistrust models, knives can basically be expected to be responsive towards the groups, where responsiveness pays off. Le Grand thus argues that “if the aim is to provide an incentive for increasing the responsiveness of providers to users' needs and wants, there have to be consequences for the provider of the choices made by the user: that is, providers from whom the user exits have to be penalised in some way while those to whom the user goes for service have to be rewarded. An obvious way of ensuring that the right incentives are present is for the money to follow the user. So providers losing users would also lose resources while those gaining them would gain resources” (2003: 83). At a minimum, a public organization is typically closed if it does not have any users. Thus, a working choice model gives the knives an incentive to be responsive to the users.

If user voice exists, voice mechanisms – for instance user boards – can also formulate rules, which restrict the opportunistic behaviour of knives. In this idealized model, voice can thus be a way to increase user responsiveness. The question is, however, whether the user boards have sufficient competencies to make rules strong enough to sanction opportunistic behaviour. High levels of PSE can be expected to secure better working voice and choice, as it requires some capacities of the users to secure the functioning of the market by switching between different producers and articulate user preferences by speaking up in voice based assemblies. Hence, higher PSE implies higher user responsiveness when voice and choice exist. While user responsiveness can be ensured by the combination of choice, high PSE and incentive systems where the money follows the users, the information asymmetry makes it more difficult to design mistrust models, which reward or sanction political responsiveness (unless the politicians only want user responsiveness). Knives are expected to act

opportunistically, implying that gaming is a serious risk when politicians use the mistrust model to ensure political responsiveness. Gaming occurs “when individuals or institutions change their behaviour in ways that conform to the letter (or number) of the target, but actually do little genuinely to improve the service concerned—and might even harm the people whom it is supposed to benefit” (Le Grand, 2010: 63). For example, Le Grand (ibid.) mentions the unnecessary admitting of patients into a general hospital ward from the accident and emergency department in order to count them as “seen” within the four hours and ambulances that concentrated on dealing with emergencies a short distance away so as to meet the political requirement for a response within eight minutes.

Non-paternalistic knights (see table 4, first row) are expected to try to be responsive towards users as well as politicians. Voice and choice based models of service provision functions as methods for communicating user needs and improve the options for being responsive. Thus, the knights are expected to be more responsive when voice and choice mechanisms exist. The distinction between trust and mistrust models is not expected to matter for the responsiveness of non-paternalistic knights, because they are responsive for other reasons than rewards and sanctions. However, mistrust may crowd out the PSM motivation and turn the knights into knaves. Again high levels of PSE secures a better articulation of user preferences and hence more responsiveness. Knights are more responsive to queens than to pawns.

The responsiveness of the paternalistic knight may be purposeful and entrepreneurial, but it is based upon their own uniquely developed set of professional or public goals (Bryer, 2007). In the absence of choice and voice, paternalistic knights therefore have a low responsiveness to politicians and users, because they think that they know best. If voice exists they will be slightly more responsive than if it does not, as they will listen and act upon user voice, if it does not conflict with their own set of goals

(Le Grand, 2010: 65). This changes a little when choice is introduced. If choice is combined with trust, being unresponsive will “only” mean that fewer users choose the provider, and this is be a problem for the paternalistic knight, who actually want to help (but according to his own understanding of helping). If choice is combined with mistrust - for instance by making reimbursement activity-based - the resources for “doing good” will also be reduced, if the providers are unresponsive, because users choose other providers. In this case, we expect a little higher level of responsiveness from the paternalistic knights, as they are motivated to be responsive as it makes it possible to do more good in their own definition of what the good is. Also in this case, high levels of PSE will contribute to secure that voice and choice lead to responsiveness.

In order to be able to discuss the implications of this across service areas, we need to know how PSE and PSM vary. Therefore, the methods and analysis applied in the analysis of variations in PSE and PSM across service areas are presented in the following.

3. Research design

The variations in PSM and PSE are analyzed across four service areas: Higher education, hospitals, schools and day care. These service areas have been selected as elements of voice and choice are used in the service provision in all the areas, while an analysis of variations in PSM and PSE are required in order to discuss how well the models of service-provision can be expected to work in terms of responsiveness. Considering voice based models user-boards exist in schools, in day care, hospitals and higher educations. User satisfaction surveys exist in schools, kindergartens and hospitals. In higher education, systematic student evaluations are made. There is also a free choice of service provider across the service areas, but it is to some extent restricted by availability.

3.1. Data and method

The article draws on two surveys. One survey measures PSM among public service providers and the other survey measures PSE among the users.

The survey of PSM is based on 3,333 Danish service providers between the age of 25 and 64 of which 377 were employed in the sectors subject to investigation here (see table 3 for number of individual service providers across service areas). The data were collected by Zapera in June 2009 using a web-panel. The representativeness of web-panels can be seriously questioned. Our aim is not to be able to generalise to the Danish population as such, but to analyze and compare how PSM vary across service areas. However, the results may be biased, for instance if school teachers participating in the web-panel share unobserved characteristics such as being more or less motivated, than school teachers in general.

Perry's original measure of PSM included 24 items, and as this is a lot to include in a survey, and hence Coursey and Pandey (2007) developed an abbreviated version in which the dimension Self-Sacrifice (SS) is excluded. They argue that three dimensions (commitment to the public interest (CPI), compassion (COM) and attraction to policy making (ATP) coincide with the three theoretical motivational dimensions, e.g. normative, affective and rational reasons (Perry and Wise, 1990), and furthermore the omission of SS can be justified due to high correlation with the CPI dimension (Coursey and Pandey, *ibid.*). This is however still contested in the literature (Kim, 2010; Kim et al., 2010; Coursey et al., 2008). In this analysis the SS dimension is excluded (Appendix A shows the PSM questions).

The survey of PSE is based on 1056 respondents to a web-survey collected by User-needs in December 2010. Of these, 859 used one of the sectors analysed here (see table 3). In order to get a sufficient amount of respondents in the different categories, we chose a stratification, which secured a minimum number of persons in each age-category. The strata also secured a distribution on geography and gender in proportion with the

population. Web-surveys are generally biased and when investigating PSE, the participant in web panels can be expected to be able to have a higher user capacity than the users in general as they are able to use the web. This is particularly a problem in the higher age groups. Therefore, we encourage future research in this field to also use different methods of data-collection. As we are primarily interested in analyzing the variation in PSE and PSM across the service areas, this is mainly a problem if the bias varies across the service areas. Patients in hospitals are on average older than the users in the other service areas and as the user of hospitals in the survey are more healthy and younger the results here are not representative for older users of hospitals, and user capacity in hospital can be expected to be slightly overestimated (Andersen et al., 2011a). Apart from this the picture of variation between service areas is expected to be accurate.

Table 3: Description of users along the four public service area

	Hospitals	Schools	Daycare	Higher education	Total
The users are...	Persons who have – or whose relatives have - been hospitalized for more than 2 weeks	Parents to children in school	Parents to children in day care	Students of higher education	
Number of investigated users	473	195	89	102	859 users
The investigated providers are...	Physicians	School teachers	Pre-school teachers	University teachers	
Number of investigated providers	56	189	104	28	377 providers

Table 4: Average PSE for the four areas of public service, individual items and total PSE score

	INFORMED I would be better to obtain information about [service name] than most other [service users]	SELFQUAL I would be qualified to chose between various [service dev. organisations] that could perform a [service name]	OTHERS I would be at least as good at evaluating the quality of [service name] as most people	UNDERSTND I would be able to obtain a fairly good understanding of the most important aspects regarding [service name]	PUBOFFICE I would consider myself to be qualified to participate in a [name of user board for the service area] in a [service delivery org.]	Total PSE score (scale 5-25)	Total PSE score (scale 0-100)	N (respondents valid for all questions)
Schools	3.2	3.6	4.2	4.3	3.8	19.1	70.7	165
Day-care	3.1	4.0	4.4	4.4	4.1	20.0	74.9	76
Higher education	3.0	4.0	4.0	4.1	3.6	18.6	68.0	95
Hospitals	3.8	3.7	3.8	4.2	3.4	18.8	69.0	389

In the survey among public service users, the sample was restricted to respondents who were actual users of the public service in question, i.e. schools, day-care, home care, education and hospitals, see Table 3. However, home care was later excluded from the analysis. All respondents were seen as potential users of hospital services and were asked questions about their PSE in this role, but the calculation of PSE for hospitals is based on the persons who had recently used a hospital.

In order to be able to compare PSE across service sectors, it is important to have items which can be compared across service areas. Furthermore, the items need to reflect the same theoretical concept (PSE) across the service areas. In this case an index for PSE can be calculated for each service area. If the items have equal weight in the indexes the areas can be compared. A factor analysis showed that this to a large extent is the case (Andersen et al., 2011a). The items were summarized in the indexes in order to secure that the items have an equal weight in each service area. Appendix II shows the full list of items and factor loadings

4. PSM and PSE in four service areas

As a stepping stone in order to discuss responsiveness in situations with different provider motivation and user agency more specifically, we measure the level of PSE and PSM in four key service areas. Table 4 shows the average PSE for each service area. Especially users of elementary schools and day-care have high PSE, while students in higher education have a relatively lower average level of PSE.

If we turn to the investigation of PSM (table 5), we find that the level of PSM differs between service areas. Pre-school teachers (working with day-care) have the highest PSM, and school teachers have the second highest level of PSM followed by the physicians. Teachers working at institutions of higher education have the lowest overall PSM.

Table 5: Average scores for the public service providers on PSM dimensions

	Att. policy making (0-100)	Com. public interest (0-100)	Compassion (0-100)	Total PSM score (0-300)	N (respondents valid for all PSM items)
Pre-school teachers	41.4	80.0	82.9	204.3	91
Teachers in schools	43.2	81.3	81.8	206.3	171
Physicians	45.0	77.9	74.9	197.8	49
Teachers of higher edu.	39.3	75.8	76.2	191.3	25


Note: The professional group averages on PSM dimensions are factor scores from a PAF factor analysis calibrated to a 0-100 scale. The total PSM score is the sum of the score on the three dimensions.

Figure 1 below summarises the analysis of the variations in PSE and PSM in the four service areas. It illustrates that students enrolled in higher education have a relatively low average PSE, and that teachers in higher education also have a relatively low average PSM, while day-care have high scores of PSE as well as PSM. Hospitals and higher education have similar levels in terms of PSE, while day-care and schools have similar levels in terms of PSM.

A number of points are noteworthy. Firstly, day-care have high PSE combined with high PSM. Second, elementary schools have very high PSM combined with medium PSE. Third, hospitals have a level of PSM rather in the middle combined with a relatively low PSE. Lastly, higher education

has a relatively low score on both dimensions. The analysis shows that there is variation in PSE and PSM across service areas.

Figure 1: Illustration relative levels of *public service motivation* and user capacity



Note: The figure shows the relative PSM and PSE as shown in table 4 and 5. It corresponds to Le Grand’s figure 1.1 (2003, 16).

The PSM scale goes from 0 to 400, while the PSE scale goes from 0 to 100. Figuratively speaking, the average public service provider is therefore nearer to the pure knight (PSM=400) than to the pure knave (PSM=0). Correspondingly, the users in all service areas are closer to queens (PSE=100) than to pawns (PSE=0). For all the service areas, there is considerable variation between providers and between users, but the *average* PSM and PSE still differ between the service areas.

Paternalism

It is more difficult to compare the average level of paternalism between service areas, but the survey included a question which may give an indication. The providers were thus asked whether they agreed that ”the job is done when the user is satisfied”. It can be used as an indicator of paternalism, because individuals with a high level of paternalism will not agree with this, because they think that they know best themselves what is good for society and users, while non-paternalistic knights will tend to agree, because they let the users define what is good for them. Especially

professionals are expected to be paternalistic, and professionalism also covaries with the indicator of paternalism for the four service areas. University teachers, who have high professionalism, are most paternalistic followed by physicians (who also have high professionalism) and teachers (whose professionalism is medium). Pre-school teachers are least paternalistic and have the lowest level of professionalism (see Andersen & Pedersen, 2010 for a discussion of the professionalism of the investigated occupations). Given that PSM, PSE and paternalism vary between the service areas, responsiveness is also expected to vary as discussed in the next section.

5. Implications for responsiveness across service areas

Following the argument presented in table 2, the overall implication of the results in section 4 is that responsiveness is highest in day-care, followed by schools and hospitals, while it is lowest for higher education. Still, there are challenges towards responsiveness for all the service areas, and the four service areas are used to illustrate the theoretical argument concerning PSE, PSM and responsiveness under different models of service provision.

5.1 Day-care: Low paternalism, high PSM and high PSE

Danish day-care is characterized by relatively high PSM and PSE and low degree of paternalism. Combined with the argument presented in table 2, this implies that user responsiveness is high, especially when choice and voice mechanisms exist. Most parents, who have children in day-care, can utilize choice and make an informed selection of service provider (a specific day-care centre or a home day-care provider), and when they have chosen, they can also tell the (non-paternalistic) providers what they want (and be heard).

User-boards are an example of a voice-mechanism. In user boards, the users who receive welfare services produced by a given provider organization, elect a board which participates in decision-making in the specific

organization. Still, the participatory patterns in the user boards may be problematic to responsiveness. From studies of participation in user boards at schools, it is known that even if parents report to be very satisfied with the boards, the willingness to vote and run for election to the boards have been low and even declining (Christensen, 2003:104). The elected board members may therefore not be representative of the general user group; especially because education is generally positively correlated with political efficacy as well as PSE (Niemi et al., 1991). This may cause a bias in the articulation of interests. Even though user responsiveness is generally high, it may not mean high responsiveness for all types of users. Additionally, the influence of the users boards may be low, both due to their formal statutes, and because more paternalistic service providers seek to ensure their professional autonomy rather than facilitate the collaboration with the user representatives on the boards (Floris & Bidsted, 1996; Christensen, 2003: 105). The more paternalistic, the providers are, the less likely they are to facilitate the cooperation.

User responsiveness may also conflict with political responsiveness. Contradictions between user groups and politicians may arise, especially for a service area like day-care where the parents want the politicians to spend as much as possible, while the politicians also have other service areas to consider (Indenrigsministeriet, 1998: 43-45). For day-care, this dilemma is illustrated during budget negotiations when parents and employees often stand side by side in demonstrations against cut-backs, often organized by members of the user boards. If user boards get real authority, it can also be seen as a departure from the parliamentary chain of command, which models the process of preference aggregation as going from citizens to the elected politicians and then to the service providers (Olsen, 1978; Nørgaard Kristensen, 1998; Indenrigsministeriet, *ibid.*).

The combination of high PSM, high PSE and low paternalism implies that user responsiveness is relatively high especially when voice and choice

exist, but there may still be conflicts between different types of responsiveness, indicating that it is necessary to take into account that different users can have different preferences and to explicitly consider the balance of power between politicians, service providers and users.

5.2.2 Schools: Paternalism, high PSM and medium PSE

The combination of school teachers with high, relatively paternalistic PSM and parents with medium PSE implies that user responsiveness in schools is a little lower compared with day-care. Table 2 implies that mistrust models may force paternalistic service providers to be more responsive towards user, and this is highly relevant for an occupation like the Danish teachers. They are as paternalistic as physicians, but have lower prestige in the population (A4, 2006). At least in Denmark, they are more often 'forced' to be user-responsive than occupations with higher prestige.

The introduction of individual student plans (in Danish: elevplaner) can be seen as a mistrust initiative, because the teachers are sanctioned, if they do not make the student plans. The plans are used to evaluate the pupils on a wide range of subjects and serve as a guideline for discussions of pupils' progress with pupils and parents. Student plans have been seen as very controlling by many teachers and their union, although some teachers see it as supportive for the quality of their communication. If it is seen as a control device, it seems to crowd out the teachers' enjoyment of the work, and this may in turn reduce performance (Nielsen, Jakobsen & Andersen, in press). It is also possible that PSM is crowded out, changing knights to knaves (Jakobsen, 2010). On the other hand, student plans actually seem increase the user responsiveness in schools (EVA, 2008: 95-96). The example thus shows both the potential and the danger in trying to make paternalistic knight more user-responsive; it is not impossible, but it may also cost in terms of motivation.

5.2.3 Hospitals: Paternalism, medium PSM and low PSE

PSE is relatively low at hospitals, implying that user responsiveness is lower for this service area compared to both day-care and school, because the users do not have as much capacity for exercising voice and choice. At the same time, physicians are more paternalistic than day-care workers, and they have a medium level of PSM, indicating that there are knaves as well as knights.

The argument presented in Table 2 implies that both knaves and paternalistic knights are more user-responsive if this is necessary to attract users and resources due to the combination of choice and a mistrust budgeting system in a quasi-market system. For example, private hospitals are very user-responsive, because hospital patients after two months waiting time have a choice between public and private hospitals which then get paid per patient (via a diagnosis related group (DRG) system). This for example results in short waiting lists, user friendly surroundings and high-quality food (Andersen & Jakobsen, 2010). This responsiveness is not, however, for all the users. Vibholt (2007) has thus shown that the choice between private and public clinics has led to dumping, e.g. a situation where especially private clinics avoid the most difficult and complicated patients. Still, the clinical procedures used at private and public clinics are exactly the same, indicating that professional norms (in accordance with the trust model) regulate these key decisions, while more knavish motives come into play concerning non-clinical decisions such as patient selection (Andersen & Jakobsen, 2010). Even for very professional groups such as orthopedic surgeons, professional norms do not regulate all. This is perhaps regrettable when dumping happens, but it also leaves some room for patient voice and user responsiveness. The introduction of choice in quasi-markets may lead to higher responsiveness towards some user groups rather than others not just in hospitals, but also in other service areas (Christensen, 2003:116-149).

Like many other countries, Denmark uses activity-based reimbursement, but the percentage of the budget which depends on activity is low for public hospitals (Jakobsen, 2010), and there is still a lot of trust in the professional norms of the providers. There is institutionalized voice (e.g. patient boards), and the patients have a choice between different hospitals for almost all hospital services. It is, however, important to remember that the users must have PSE enough to make informed choices, and that there must be a real choice. If hospitals have long waiting lists, the physicians - both knaves and paternalistic knights - can afford to be unresponsive towards users. Still, the implication of the combination of PSM, PSE and paternalism at hospitals is low political responsiveness, and it is difficult to change, because it is difficult to link rewards and sanctions to other political goals concerning hospitals than fulfillment of user needs. The difference between these goal and goals linked to user responsiveness is that choice can be used to obtain user responsiveness, because both knaves and knights want resources and therefore “customers in the shop”. For political goals unrelated to this, gaming is expected for knaves (as discussed in section 2.4), and paternalistic knights may also circumvent the political demands and wishes to do what as they think themselves is best.

5.2.3 Higher education: Paternalism, relatively low PSM, medium PSE

Higher education differs from hospitals by having individual providers with relatively lower PSM and a little higher level of paternalism and users with higher PSE. Teachers in higher education are, in other words, more knavish than the other investigated service providers. This implies that user responsiveness is likely to be low unless choice is combined with a mistrust budgeting system. Political responsiveness will also often be low; although politicians formulate the criteria in a mistrust model, it is very difficult to design incentive or command systems in professionalized service areas without unintended consequences. One thing is that money and command can reduce the individual providers’ enjoyment of the work itself, and this is typically high for professionals (Andersen & Pallesen, 2008; Jakobsen &

Andersen, 2009). Another thing is that such systems may, as mentioned, lead to ‘gaming’ (Le Grand, 2010: 61).

Politicians may have conflicting goals, and there may be inconsistency between short term and long term political goals (Kyddland and Prescott, 1977). In this case, politicians may use delegation to experts and professionals as a way to create an arm-length relationship in order to secure that they cannot interfere to reach short-sighted goals. They can, in other words, use delegation to professionals to create a credible commitment to long term political goals (Miller, 2000). The combination of the trust model with an activity-based reimbursement system at the universities is an example of this. Politicians want both high quality candidates and many candidates. The first objective, e.g. quality, is secured by basing the evaluation of students on the teachers’ assessment (which again are based on professional norms). Essentially, the professionals are trusted to set the standards for qualifications (Andersen & Serritzlew, 2006). The other objective, e.g. many candidates, is secured by the activity-based reimbursement which provides an incentive to increase pass rates. This illustrates that paternalism is not necessarily bad in all circumstances. Paternalists think they know best what is good for society and users, but this may be due to responsiveness towards professionally defined norms and goals (Bayer, 2008). As the professions have high levels of abstract and theoretical knowledge and tight norms for their application in the provision of particular services (Andersen and Pedersen, 2010), the responsiveness towards professional goals may be necessary in order to secure a high quality in service provision.

The discussion of what implications variation in PSE, PSM and paternalism have for responsiveness across service areas shows that responsiveness is not just a matter of giving the users what they want, but that responsiveness towards users, politicians and goals uniquely defined by service providers on what constitutes the public interest is relevant for public service

provision. Thus, even though it has been argued that responsiveness should be abandoned as a central concept (Vigoda, 2002), recent research (Beyer, 2006) and the analysis here call for a more encompassing view of responsiveness in terms of who service providers should be responsive towards, and how they should more specifically be responsive.

6. Conclusion

The paper has analysed how public service motivation and user capacity vary across four central service areas, e.g. day-care, schools, hospitals and higher education, and it has discussed the implications for responsiveness under different models of service provision for these service areas. After a short review of our theoretical argument and the main empirical findings, conclusions are drawn about the implications of PSE, PSM and models of service provision for the level of responsiveness.

The basic theoretical argument is that variations in the level of PSE have implications for how responsive (paternalistic) knights and knaves are under different models of service provision. When both voice and choice exist responsiveness is higher, and similarly more PSM and less paternalism implies a higher responsiveness towards users and politicians. Models of service provision combined with mistrust can make knaves and paternalistic knights more responsive. In this context, the users are more able to make qualified choices and speak up to the service providers if their PSE is high. Thus a higher PSE generally implies higher responsiveness. This means that if the users have a low PSE, additional measures may be required to ensure responsiveness.

PSE, PSM and paternalism vary across service areas, although size of the variation should not be exaggerated. Still, PSE and PSM are higher in day-care and schools than in hospitals and higher education. Additionally, the teachers are more paternalistic than the pre-school teachers. Under these conditions, voice mechanisms (such as user-boards) are more likely to have

a positive impact on user-responsiveness than in areas where PSE is relatively lower – such as hospitals and higher education. In contrast to Le Grand, who argues that user capacity is mainly a normative question, the analysis here suggests that variation in user capacity is also an empirical matter.

The mapping of variations in user capacity and PSM across service areas implies that different models of service provision will facilitate responsiveness towards users and politicians. We argue that voice models (such as for instance user boards) primarily ensure responsiveness in areas where PSE is high and paternalism is low. This implies that other models of service provision may need to be implemented in areas with low PSE and high paternalism if user responsiveness is a political priority. In areas where paternalism is relatively high – as in schools compared to day care – incentives or regulations based on command-and-control can be applied as a measure to increase user responsiveness. The introduction of student plans is an example of a command-and-control regulation, but mistrust as a model of service delivery may turn knights – and paternalistic knights – into knaves. Hence, even if gains are made in terms of user responsiveness, this may cost in terms of motivation.

A choice based model of service provision is another way to may make paternalistic knights and knaves more user-responsive if it is combined with a grant systems which links the number of users to resource allocation. There may, however, be a trade-off between responsiveness and equity in terms of using these mechanisms for areas such as hospitals with relatively low levels of PSE and PSM. The service providers may namely be more responsive to the needs of the more profitable users, and users with low PSE may not have the capacity to utilize the user choice, and hence they will not experience an increase in user responsiveness. If the users do not have the capacity to make informed choices in the quasi-markets, they may have to rely on the guidance of the service providers, who can be knaves or

paternalistic or non-paternalistic knights. The more knavish the providers are the worse of the users with low PSE are likely to be. Even though paternalism may counteract user responsiveness in the short run, it may secure political long term goals. This can be illustrated for higher education. Here the politicians may on one hand want as many candidates as possible to be educated, but in the long run society has an interest in securing not just many candidates, but also high quality candidates. In order to create a credible commitment to quality in the long run, delegation to the professionals may be necessary. Hence, some level of responsiveness to professional goals, which is linked to paternalism, can in some cases be desirable in the long run.

As such, the discussion of what implications variation in PSE and PSM have for responsiveness shows a need to move on from the rather simplistic focus on user responsiveness which was inherent in the early days of NPM. There are potential contradictions between user responsiveness and political responsiveness, and being responsive to particular user groups may undermine the overall responsiveness to the democratically formed political goals and put priority to some user groups rather than others. Still, democratically formed formal rules leave room for discretion. Hence, the service providers can to some extent be responsive towards professional goals and non-paternalistic knights can also be responsive towards users. We therefore find it important to continue to discuss these different types of responsiveness in public service provision.

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Appendix A: PSM questions

Attraction to public policy making (Cronbach's alpha: 0.65)

I associate politics with something positive

The give-and-take of public policy-making doesn't appeal to me (R)

I do not care much about politicians (R)

Commitment to the public interest (Cronbach's alpha: 0.72)

I contribute to my community

Meaningful public service is very important to me

I would prefer seeing public officials do what is best for the whole community even if it harmed my interests

I consider public service my civic duty

Compassion (Cronbach's alpha: 0.61)

It is difficult for me to contain my feelings when I see people in distress

To me, considering the welfare of others is very important

I am often reminded by daily events about how dependent we are on one another

Appendix B: PSE questions

	Hospital	Elementary school	Day care	Higher education
INFORMED	I would be better to obtain information about knee surgery than most other patients	I am better informed about my child's school than most other parents	I am better informed about my child's day care institution than most other parents	I am better informed about various institutions for further education than most other students
SELFQUAL	I would be qualified to chose between various hospitals that could perform a knee operation	I can make a qualified choice between various schools	I regard myself able to make a qualified choice between various day care institution	I regard myself able to make a qualified choice between various institutions for further education
OTHERS	I would be at least as good at evaluating the quality of knee operations as most people	I am at least as good at evaluating my child's school as most other people	I am at least as good at evaluating the quality at my child's day care institution as most other people	I am at least as good at evaluating the quality between various institutions for further education as most other people
UNDERSTND	I would be able to obtain a fairly good understanding of the most important aspects regarding knee operations	I have a fairly good understanding of the most important aspects concerning my child's school	I have a fairly good understanding of the most important aspects concerning my child's day care institution	I have a fairly good understanding of the most important aspects concerning my educational institution
PUBOFFICE	I would consider myself to be qualified to participate in a user board in a hospital	I consider myself qualified to participate in the school board	I consider myself qualified to participate in the user board at my child's day care institution	I consider myself qualified to participate in relevant decision making bodies at my educational institution